

Three Questions by John of Wesel on *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia*

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I

The manuscript Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Class XI n. 12, Zanetti Latini 301 (= 1576), contains on fols. 1r–24v a seemingly unique copy of a series of fifteen logical questions, ten on *obligationes* and the remaining five on *insolubilia*.¹ The series on *obligationes* is untitled and unattributed in the manuscript, but the questions on *insolubilia* begin (fol. 18^r11) “Incipiunt quaestiones super insolubilibus,” and are attributed at the end to a certain John of Wesel (fol. 24^v41): “Ergo expletae sunt quaestiones insolubilium a Johanne de Vesalia Parixius² disputatae. Deo gratias. Amen.”

Despite the first series’ lack of attribution, the two sets of questions seem to belong together. For in q. 3 on *insolubilia*, John discusses a view that amounts to saying that a term occurring as part of a proposition cannot supposit for the whole proposition of which it is a part. Such a denial of self-reference, he says, is to be rejected “secundum quod prius fuit visum” (fol. 21^v20). This appears to be a reference back to q. 2 on *obligationes*, which discusses self-reference at length.³ It is probably safe to say, therefore, that the two sets of questions form a pair, and that both are by John of Wesel.

II

Almost nothing is known definitely about the author of these questions. As quoted above, the *explicit* to the questions on *insolubilia* indicates that they were disputed at Paris. The *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis* mentions two persons named “Johannes de Wesalia” there, one — rather well attested — in 1344–1353,⁴ and another

¹ See Paul Vincent Spade, *The Mediaeval Liar: A Catalogue of the Insolubilia-Literature*, (“Subsidia Mediaevalia,” vol. 5; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975), items XLI–XLII, pp. 71–74.

² Parixius = Parisius. See Johann Georg Theodor Grasse and Friedrich Benedict, *Orbis Latinus: Lexikon lateinischer geographischer Namen des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit*, Helmut and Sophie-Charlotte Plechl, ed., 3 vols., (Braunschweig: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1972), at vol. 3, p. 107.

³ See Spade, *The Mediaeval Liar*, pp. 71, 74.

⁴ See Heinrich Denifle et al., ed. *Auctarium Chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. nova, 6 vols. (Paris: apud Heinricum Didier, 1937–1964), at vol. 1 (1937), cols. 69.30; 72.9; 77.7, 23, 32, 44; 80.1 (Wessalya), 34, 48; 83.1, 18; 84.43; 85.13; 86.18, 25, 32; 87.24; 89.24; 90.25; 92.42, 44; 93.1, 4, 12, 28, 30, 31, 50; 94.2; 95.36, 42; 96.7, 25; 98.25–26; 101.5 (Wezalia), 12, 17, 20; 104.2, 6, 8, 10, 13, 16,



in 1417.⁵ Lohr cites both of them (under the spelling ‘Vessalia’), and refers to **(a)** a *Quaestiones super artem veterem* in Vatican, Vat. lat. 2148 (15th century), fols. 81^r–128^v, and **(b)** a *Quaestiones super libro Priorum* in Vatican, Vat. lat. 3047 (15th century), fols. 1^r–48^v (spelled ‘Vesalia’).⁶ He does not claim to settle which of these two texts (if either) is to be assigned to which author. Lohr also cites **(c)** a separate *Quaestiones super artem veterem* (under the spelling ‘Vexalia’) in Vatican, Rossiana lat. 658 (15th century), fols. 1^r–43^v (spelled ‘Vexallia’),⁷ and remarks without comment that its author is apparently “not to be identified” with that of **(a)** and **(b)**. Presumably his reasoning is that a single man would not have written two sets of *quaestiones* on the *ars vetus*. But such reasoning, although plausible, is not decisive.

Kristeller, in addition to Venice, San Marco, Zan. lat. 301,⁸ and text **(c)** above,⁹ cites **(d)** a “Jo. de Vesalia, questions on Aristotle’s *Analytica Priora* and on Petrus Hispanus” in Vatican, Vat. lat. 3047, but says nothing about its author. Presumably this is the same text as **(b)** above.¹⁰ He also cites **(e)** Vatican, Reg. Lat. 1450, “Jo. de Wesalia (professor at Pavia), de moribus pestilentibus,”¹¹ and **(f)** Stresa, *Collegio Rosminiano*, “De Marina, *La legatura* III, p. 19, n. 2557 E. mbr. xv. Illuminated. 47 fols. Joh. de Vessallia, contra pestem, to Franc. Sfortia.”¹² This is apparently the same text as **(e)** above. There is no known reason to associate its author with Paris.

There is a striking textual similarity between the first question on *obligationes* in the San Marco manuscript and an anonymous mid-fourteenth century author’s *De arte obligatoria* preserved in a Merton College manuscript.¹³ In addition, both sets of ques-

20; 106.4, 48; 107.2, 20; 108.18, 26; 109.12; 112.12, 15, 19, 21, 44; 114.4, 41; 115.34, 37; 116.22, 32; 117.36; 118.21, 25, 44–45; 119.3, 24, 37; 121.31; 122.23; 123.20; 124.30, 33, 35, 38; 125.5; 128.18, 36; 129.26, 30, 31, 36–37 (Wezalia); 130.5, 13, 16, 47; 131.2, 7–8, 13, 38, 40, 42; 132.17; 140.37–38, 39, 41, 43, 45; 142.2, 5, 30 (Vesalia); 143.6 (Vesalia), 25 (Vesalia); 144.32 (Vesalia), 36 (Vesalia); 145.20 (Vesalia), 36; 146.9 (Wezalia), 20 (Wezalia), 27 (Wezalia); 148.14; 150.8; 152.31; 154.13 (Wezalia); 155.19, 25, 36; 156.1–2, 13, 17, 21, 32–33, 38; 157.7, 15–16, 26, 28, 31; 158.19–20, 35; 159.5 (Vesalia), 21 (Vesalia), 27 (Vesalia); 163.20 (Veselya).

⁵ Ibid., vol. 2 (1937), cols. 225.23, 226.23.

⁶ Charles H. Lohr, “Mediaeval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Johannes de Kanthi — Myngodus,” *Traditio* 27 (1971), pp. 251–351 at pp. 299–300.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 300–301. Note that Lohr gives no reason to associate this author with Paris.

⁸ Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Iter italicum: A Finding List of Uncatalogued or Incompletely Catalogued Humanistic Manuscripts of the Renaissance in Italian and Other Libraries*, vol. 2: *Italy. Orvieto to Volterra. Vatican City*, 6 vols., (London: The Warburg Institute, 1963–1993), at vol. 2 (1967), p. 212.

⁹ Ibid., p. 466: “658 (x 39). misc. XIV–XV. Jo. de Vexalia, questions on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and on Aristotle’s *Categories* and *de interpretatione*, ...”

¹⁰ This work may or may not be the same as an “*Exercitium Metaphysicae*” by a John of Wesel, preserved in a Basel manuscript, as cited by Friedrich Stegmüller in his review of Gerhard Richter’s *Studien zur Spätscholastik. III. Neue Quellenstücke zur Theologie des Johann von Wesel*, in *Theologische Revue* 28 (1929), cols. 305–309, at col. 308.

¹¹ Kristeller, op. cit., p. 402. See also Stegmüller, op. cit., col. 308, and n. 15 below.

¹² Kristeller, op. cit., p. 573. Franz Sforza died in 1466; see Stegmüller, op. cit., cols. 308–309.

¹³ Edited and studied in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, “The Anonymous *De arte obligatoria* in Merton College Ms 306,” in E. P. Bos, ed., *Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics: Studies Dedicated to L.M. de Rijk, Ph.D., Professor of Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy at the University of*

tions show a close familiarity with the writings of Oxford logicians from the first half of the fourteenth century, in particular with those of Roger Swyneshed.¹⁴ I am inclined therefore to identify the author of the questions in the San Marco manuscript with the John of Wesel who was at Paris in 1344–1353. But this attribution is conjectural, and is far from certain.

It should be noted that our author is *not* to be identified with the much later Johannes (Rucherath) of (Ober-) Wesel (c. 1425–1481), who taught at Erfurt, Worms and Basel, but not at Paris.¹⁵

III

Zanetti's 1741 catalogue of the San Marco manuscripts describes the manuscript laconically as follows¹⁶:

CODEX CCCI. *Bess.*¹⁷
*in 8 chartaceus, foliorum 56.*¹⁸
saeculi XV.

THOMAE De Anglia de insolubilibus.

Alia sequuntur ad Logicam spectantia sine nomine auctoris.

BURLAEI [Valteri] obligationes.

A fuller description may be found under the heading “Classis XI: Mathesis, Astronomia, Astrologia” in the Valentinelli catalogue¹⁹:

Leiden on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday, (= “Artistarium,” supplementa, vol. 2; Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1985), pp. 239–280). On the similarity between parts of this text and John of Wesel's first question on *obligationes*, see Paul Vincent Spade, “Opposing and Responding: A New Look at *Positio*,” *Medioevo: Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 19 (1993), pp. 233–270 at pp. 241–244.

¹⁴ See § V below. Indeed, the entire manuscript, as described in § III below, shows a strong connection to Oxford logic of that period.

¹⁵ See Anton Brück, article “Johannes Rucherath v. (Ober-) Wesel a. Rh.,” *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, vol. v, col. 1097; and Stegmüller, op. cit., col. 309. Stegmüller suggests that this last John of Wesel is the author of the treatise described above on the plague and addressed to Franz Sforza. See *ibid.*, cols. 308–309.

¹⁶ Antonio Maria Zanetti, *Latina et italica d. Marci bibliotheca codicum manu scriptorum per titulos singulos digesta*, ([Venice]: apud Simonem Occhi Bibliopolam, 1741), p. 132.

¹⁷ The manuscript was donated to the Venice library by Cardinal Bessarion in 1468. For an account of Bessarion's donation, see Henri Auguste Omont, “Inventaire des manuscrits grecs et latins donnés a Saint-Marc de Venise par le Cardinal Bessarion (1468),” *Revue des bibliothèques* 4 (1894), pp. 129–187.

¹⁸ In fact, there are 58 folios, not 56, even disregarding a flyleaf at the end. See Valentinelli's description, below.

¹⁹ *Bibliotheca manuscripta ad S. Marci Venetiarum digessit et commentarium addidit Joseph Valentinelli*, 6 vols. in 2, (Venice: Ex typographica commercii, 1868–1873), at vol. 4 (1871), pp. 223–224.



Cod. 12 membr., saec. XIV,²⁰ a. 210, l. 142 [Z. L. CCCI]. B.²¹

I. Anonymi, *quaestiones decem de obligationibus in dialectica*. «Quaeritur primo utrum principia artis obligatoriae in disputatione dialectica sint necessaria; arguitur quod non ...», f. 1–18.

II. *Quaestiones quinque super insolubilibus a Johanne de Vesalia Pariziis disputatae*. «Quaeritur primo utrum in insolubilibus sit ...», f. 18–25.²²

III. Magistri Thomae Bradvardini de Anglia, *insolubilia, capitibus quatuordecim*. «Solvere non est ignorantum vinculum, 3.^o metaphysicae ca. p.^o Qui ergo insolubilium vinculo sunt ignari, nodum ipsorum ambiguum nequeunt aperire ...»,²³ f. 27–37. V. p. 164.x²⁴

IV. *Brevia insolubilia et utilia, secundum usum Esoniensem*. Capitula octo. «In disputatione dialectica sunt duae partes, scilicet opponens et respondens ...», f. 37–41.²⁵

V. *Tractatus obligationum Suseyt de Anglia*. «Cum in singulis scientiis, secundum magnitudinem subiecti, sit certitudo quaerenda, primo ethicorum ...», f. 41–44.²⁶

VI. *Tractatulus de sensu composito et diviso, trifariam partitus*. «In principio uniuscuiusque operis, Domini nomen est praemittendum, nam appetitum humanum solum divina bonitas replet ...», f. 44–47.

VII. Burlaei, *obligationes*. «In disputatione dialectica duae sunt partes, scilicet opponens et respondens ...», f. 47–57.

²⁰ Note that Zanetti had described the manuscript as from the *fifteenth* century. If it is in fact from the fourteenth, that would rule out our author's being the fifteenth-century John of Wesel at Paris. (See p. 2 above.) Unfortunately, the handwriting can probably not be dated that precisely. Nevertheless, note the inscribed date October 13, 1398, at the end of Valentinelli's description.

²¹ The 'B' refers to Cardinal Bessarion. See n. 17 above.

²² In fact the questions end on fol. 24^v, not on fol. 25. Fol. 25^r contains three short notes on *insolubilia*. See Spade, *The Mediaeval Liar*, item XVI, pp. 39–40. The remainder of fol. 25^r and all of fols. 25^v–26^r are blank.

²³ Edited in Marie-Louise Roure, "La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIII^e siècle et au début du XIV^e, suivie de l'édition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge* 37 (1970), pp. 205–326.

²⁴ I presume this last refers to another copy of this work, cited in volume 5 of the Valentinelli catalogue. But I have not seen that volume.

²⁵ Romuald Green, *The Logical Treatise 'De obligationibus': An Introduction with Critical Texts of William of Sherwood and Walter Burley* (unpublished photocopy), Ch. 5, explains that this is in fact two separate works, an anonymous and incomplete *Obligaciones* (fols. 37^a–38^{vb}) followed by the *Brevia insolubilia* (so called in the *explicit*). The *incipit* of the former is like that of Burley's *Obligaciones*, but the two texts are in fact not at all the same. The *Brevia insolubilia* is in fact John Hunter's (Huntman's, Venator's) *Insolubilia*. See Spade, *the Mediaeval Liar*, item XXXIX, pp. 68–69.

²⁶ This copy was mentioned, but not used, in Paul Vincent Spade, "Roger Swyneshed's *Obligaciones*: Edition and Comments," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge* 44 (1977), pp. 243–285; reprinted in Paul Vincent Spade, *Lies, Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages*, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1988).

Idem principium ac numero IV. Ceterum differt ab initio eiusdem operis in cod. [Z. L. CCCII], praesertim brevitate.²⁷

VIII. Anonymi, *de obligationibus*. «Nunc restat tractare de obligationibus et praeponendae sunt aliquae descriptiones quorundam theorematum spectantium ad artem ...», f. 57–58.

Tractatus in fine mutilus.

In codice universo res adeo sine ordine tractatae sunt; verba ita per nexus breviores intellectu difficilia, ut Bessario, qui manu propria singulos operum auctores in propriis codicibus annotat, hunc inscripserit *logicalia*. Plura sunt folia rescripta aevi eiusdem, ut et in fine folium referens fragmentum evangelii ex saeculo XII; quo serius inscriptum: *MCCCLXXXVIII, die XIII mensis octubris*.

As described in the last paragraph of Valentinelli's description, several folios of the manuscript, including several folios of John of Wesel's questions, are palimpsests, apparently all from the same twelfth-century copy of the Gospels. This fact makes the manuscript especially hard to read in some places.

IV

Here are the incipits of John's two series of questions:

Quaestiones super obligationibus

1. (fol. 1^r1) Quaeritur primo utrum principia artis obligatoriae in disputatione dialectica sint necessaria.
2. (fol. 2^r8) Consequenter quaeritur utrum pars possit supponere pro toto.
3. (fol. 4^v17) Consequenter quaeritur utrum sint tantum tres species obligationis.
4. (fol. 6^v22) Consequenter quaeritur utrum necessarium vel impossibile sit ponendum vel deponendum.
5. (fol. 8^r28) Consequenter quaeritur utrum propter concessionem partium copulativae tota copulativa sit concedenda et propter negationem partium disjunctivae tota disjunctiva sit neganda.
6. (fol. 11^v1) Consequenter quaeritur utrum propter impositionem alicujus propositionis ad illam sit responsio varianda, hoc est, utrum propositio sit impertinens impositioni quae de novo imponitur ad significandum.

²⁷ See n. 25 above.

7. (fol. 14^r18) Consequenter quaeritur utrum omne positum in tempore obligationis sit concedendum.
8. (fol. 15^r12) Consequenter quaeritur utrum quaelibet talis ‘Nulla propositio est tibi posita’, ‘Nulla propositio est’, ‘Quaelibet propositio est a te concedenda’ si ponatur et proponatur sub eadem forma, quod sit concedenda.
9. (fol. 16^r1) Consequenter quaeritur utrum tales copulativae sint ponendae vel deponendae ‘Hoc est homo et hoc est asinus’, et omne demonstratum est homo, ‘Uterque istorum sedet et neuter istorum sedet’, et omne demonstratum per ly ‘istorum’ sedet, ‘Hoc est homo et hoc non est homo’, et tantum asinus demonstratur.
10. (fol. 17^r1) Consequenter quaeritur utrum ista regula est vera: ‘Ista consequentia est bona scita a te esse bona; et antecedens est dubium; igitur consequens non est a te negandum’.

The questions on *obligationes* end with the explicit “Et aliae rationes sunt solutae quia non probant intentum.”

Quaestiones super insolubilibus

1. (fol. 18^r12) Quaeritur primo utrum in insolubilibus sit aliqua consequentia bona, et antecedens est verum et consequens falsum.
2. (fol. 19^r24) Consequenter quaeritur utrum aliquod insolubile significat praecise sicut verba praetendunt.
3. (fol. 20^v32) Consequenter quaeritur utrum aliqua propositio causat intentionem simplicem in anima repraesentem omnes propositiones, hoc est, utrum sit aliqua simplex intentio in anima repraesentans omnem propositionem falsam ita quod isti termino ‘falsum’ in voce vel in scripto correspondeat simplex intentio in anima, et isti termino ‘verum’ in voce vel in scripto correspondeat una simplex intentio in anima cuiuslibet propositionis verae repraesentativa.
4. (fol. 22^r39) Consequenter quaeritur utrum aliquis casus in materia insolubilium sit admittendus.
5. (fol. 24^r4) Consequenter quaeritur utrum aliqua propositio quae dicitur insolubilis sit vera.



V

A complete statement of John of Wesel's views on *obligationes* and *insolubilia* is premature. Nevertheless, it is clear even now that John was familiar with the logical writings of the Oxford "Calculators," especially with Roger Swyneshed's *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia*.²⁸ In his second question on *obligationes*, for example, he asks whether self-reference is possible.²⁹ He concludes that it is, but in fact goes further: "Alia [scil. conclusio] quod terminus in aliqua propositione potest supponere pro toto vel pro opposito sui totius vel etiam pro convertibili oppositi totius" (fol. 2^v 15–16).³⁰ This unusually explicit statement of the possibility of various kinds of "pathological" reference is almost certainly an echo of Thomas Bradwardine's third assumption in his *Insolubilia*: "Tertia est ista: pars potest supponere pro suo toto et eius opposito et convertibilibus earundem."³¹

Again, in the third question on *obligationes*, John cites Walter Burley by name as holding that there are six species of *obligationes*.³² In his reply, John cites Roger Swyneshed's view ("auctor in littera") that there are only three species: *positio*, *depositio*, and *impositio*.³³ Later authors often allowed only this more restricted list.³⁴ John himself holds, in agreement with Swyneshed, that three species will suffice,³⁵ although he also

²⁸ Edited in Spade, "Roger Swyneshed's *Obligationes*"; and in Paul Vincent Spade, "Roger Swyneshed's *Insolubilia*: Edition and Comments," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge* 46 (1979), pp. 177–220. The latter, like the former, is reprinted in Paul Vincent Spade, *Lies, Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages*, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1988).

²⁹ Some authors, known sometimes collectively as the "*restringentes*," held that it was not. See Paul Vincent Spade, "Five Early Theories in the Mediaeval *Insolubilia*-Literature," *Vivarium* 25 (1987), pp. 24–46, especially § VI, pp. 38–42.

³⁰ See § I above on a reference in John's questions on *insolubilia* back to this question.

³¹ Thomas Bradwardine, *Insolubilia* §6.04, Roure, ed., p. 297. For a discussion of the more complicated kinds of "pathological" self-reference, see Spade, "Five Early Theories," pp. 38–39. On Bradwardine's theory of *insolubilia*, see Paul Vincent Spade, "*Insolubilia* and Bradwardine's Theory of Signification," *Medioevo: Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 7 (1981), pp. 115–134; reprinted in Spade, *Lies, Language and Logic*.

³² See below, *Quaestiones super obligationibus*, § (30). For Burley's view, see Walter Burley, *Obligationes*, in Green, *The Logical Treatise "De obligationibus"*, § 0.02 (quoted in n. 108 below). See also the translation in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, ed. & trans., *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Volume One: Logic and the Philosophy of Language* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 370. Burley's list of six species was more or less the standard list in the early *obligationes*-literature. See, for example, the *Obligationes Parisienses* (no later than the mid-thirteenth century), in L. M. De Rijk, "Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on the Game of Obligation, II," *Vivarium* 13 (1975), pp. 22–54 at pp. 27–28. De Rijk places this work in the early-thirteenth century, but a later date is possible as well. See Paul Vincent Spade and Eleonore Stump, "Walter Burley and the *Obligationes* Attributed to William of Sherwood," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 4 (1983), pp. 9–26, at p. 13 n. 20.

³³ See below, § (29).

³⁴ See Ashworth's discussion in Paul of Venice, *Logica magna, Part II, Fasc. 8: Tractatus de obligationibus*, E. J. Ashworth, ed. & trans., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 37 n. 11.

³⁵ See below, § (36).

says that, because of the logic of the word ‘only’ (*tantum*), it is technically false that there are “only” three species.³⁶

Again, in the fourth question on *obligationes*, John asks whether a necessary proposition or an impossible one can serve as the *obligatum* in a *positio* or a *depositio*. Swyneshed had said no,³⁷ although many other authors had allowed a special kind of *positio* in which an impossible proposition is the *positum* (and so presumably also a kind of *depositio* in which a necessary proposition is the *depositum*).³⁸

The fifth question on *obligationes* asks whether a “copulative” proposition $p \& q$ must be granted if both conjuncts have been granted, and whether a disjunctive proposition $p \vee q$ must be denied if both disjuncts are denied. One of the most characteristic and controversial features of Swyneshed’s theory is that he said “no” to both questions.³⁹

Again, the sixth question on *obligationes* asks whether the correct response to a proposition changes because of a new imposition. Another characteristic feature of Swyneshed’s theory was that he said this never happens.⁴⁰

The eighth question on *obligationes* also seems to be associated with Swyneshed,⁴¹ as does the ninth.⁴²

Again, the first question on *insolubilia* reflects an especially characteristic and controversial conclusion of Swyneshed’s theory.⁴³ John in fact *accepts* the conclusion, and in accepting it appeals to characteristic features and terminology of Swyneshed’s view.⁴⁴

³⁶ See below, § (35).

³⁷ Swyneshed, *Obligationes*, suppositiones 7–8, Spade ed., §§ (19)–(20), pp. 253–254.

³⁸ See for example, Burley, *Obligationes*, Green ed., §§ 3.01, 3.179–3.186; William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, Philotheus Boehner *et al.*, ed., (“Opera philosophica,” vol. 1: St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1974), III–3.41.44–5 and III.3.42.1–83.

³⁹ Swyneshed, *Obligationes*, Spade ed., § (32), p. 257. For a discussion of the logic behind these striking claims, see Paul Vincent Spade, “Three Theories of *Obligationes*: Burley, Kilvington and Swyneshed on Counterfactual Reasoning,” *History and Philosophy of Logic* 3 (1982), pp. 1–32, especially § 7, pp. 28–31. For a discussion of the controversial nature of the claims, see Paul Vincent Spade, “Obligations: Developments in the Fourteenth Century,” in Norman Kretzmann *et al.*, ed., *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), Ch. 16B, pp. 335–341, at pp. 335–339.

⁴⁰ Swyneshed, *Obligationes*, Spade ed., § (21), p. 254. See the discussion in Spade, “Obligations,” pp. 339–340.

⁴¹ See the discussion *ibid.*, p. 340.

⁴² See Swyneshed, *Obligationes*, Spade ed., §§ (105)–(114), pp. 276–279.

⁴³ See Swyneshed, *Insolubilia*, Spade ed., § 26, p. 189. See also Paul Vincent Spade, “Insolubilia,” in Kretzmann, *Cambridge History*, Ch. 12, pp. 246–253 at pp. 250–251; and Paul Vincent Spade, “Roger Swyneshed’s Theory of *Insolubilia*: A Study of Some of His Preliminary Semantic Notion,” in Achim Eschbach and Jürgen Trabant, ed., *History of Semiotics* (“Foundations of Semiotics,” vol. 7; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1983), pp. 105–113.

⁴⁴ For these features and this terminology, see *ibid.*

Finally, the second question on *insolubilia* discusses a characteristic claim of William Heytesbury's theory of *insolubilia*.⁴⁵

The interesting thing about these links to Oxford logicians is that they appear in a set of questions disputed at *Paris*. And if my conjecture about their author is correct,⁴⁶ they appear as early as 1344–1353. No previous evidence has come to light for any knowledge of Swyneshed's views that early in Paris.⁴⁷

VI

Throughout these two sets of questions, the San Marco manuscript presents a careless, extremely dubious and often corrupt text. It is doubtful whether an adequate edition of all fifteen questions is possible on the basis of this manuscript alone. Nevertheless, I have been able to reconstruct the text of three questions with fair confidence; they are edited below. Some doubtful readings remain, but they do not affect the overall sense. It is possible therefore to get a good idea of John's doctrine on at least these three issues.

One recurring abbreviation caused me particular trouble. It is 'det²' — that is, 'det', with a "figure-2 r" following the 't'. It occurs in §§ (2), (19), (20), (21), (26), (27), (28), (59) twice, and (61). In all cases, the subject is 'antecedens',⁴⁸ and the context suggests that 'antecedens probatur' or 'antecedens patet' would have been appropriate. With some hesitation, I have read the abbreviation as 'determinatur'. (The word 'determinatur' occurs nowhere else in these questions.) The reader should be warned about this word, although the intended sense is clear enough in any case from the context.

Of the fifteen questions, I here present the text of the first and third on *obligationes* and the first on *insolubilia*. For the first question on *obligationes*, I have taken advantage of the anonymous Merton *De arte obligatoria* to conjecture two emendations to the text. I have marked these emendations with the note '*Ex textu Mertonensi*', and given a reference first to Kretzmann and Stump, "The Anonymous *De arte obligatoria*," and then, in parentheses, to my paper "Opposing and Responding" where the particular emendation is discussed.⁴⁹

The division into paragraphs is my own. I have normalized the orthography. The manuscript has been seen in microfilm copy only.

⁴⁵ For Heytesbury's theory, see William Heytesbury, *On "Insoluble" Sentences: Chapter One of His Rules for Solving Sophisms*, Paul Vincent Spade, trans., ("Mediaeval Sources in Translation," vol. 21; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1979).

⁴⁶ See § I above.

⁴⁷ I am grateful to Professor Calvin Normore for calling my attention to this point.

⁴⁸ In the second occurrence in § (59), the subject is not expressed, but is still implicitly 'antecedens' from two sentences previously.

⁴⁹ For both papers, see n. 13 above.

<Johannis de Vesalia Quaestiones super obligationibus>

I

(1) /^{1r} Quaeritur primo utrum principia artis obligatoriae in disputatione dialectica sint necessaria.

5 (2) Arguitur quod non. Principia obligationum non sunt necessaria; igitur, non sunt necessaria in disputatione dialectica. Consequentia patet, quia oppositum consequentis infert oppositum antecedentis. Similiter arguitur a destructione consequentis ad destructionem antecedentis. Antecedens determinatur, quia principium in obligationibus est quod omne possibile debet admitti, et quod sit possibile.⁵⁰ Sed constat quod haec non
10 est necessarium, cum⁵¹ sit in voluntate respondentis an velit concedere quod sit Romae dum sit Parixius.⁵² Etiam illa regula patitur instantias: ‘Posito possibili in esse non debet sequi impossibile’ <vel ‘Posito possibili> in illam de inesse non sequitur impossibile’.⁵³ Est falsum sicut patet de omnibus istis propositionibus in sensu diviso veris: ‘Album contingit esse nigrum’, ‘Possible potest esse impossibile’,⁵⁴ si ponenter in istas⁵⁵ de inesse
15 ‘Album est nigrum’ ‘Possible est impossibile’.

(3) Item idem: Si principia artis obligatoriae essent necessaria in disputatione dialectica, sequeretur quod nullus⁵⁶ sciret disputare in arte dialectica nisi sciret obligatio-

⁵⁰ That is, if p is possible, then not only must p itself be admitted (if it is posited), but ‘ p is possible’ must also be admitted (if it is posited). The latter follows from the former, given the quite minimal modal principle that $(p)(\Box p \rightarrow p)$. For, substituting $\Box \sim p$ for p , we have: $\Box \Box \sim p \rightarrow \Box \sim p$. By contraposition, this yields: $\sim \Box \sim p \rightarrow \sim \Box \Box \sim p$. That is: $\Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond \Diamond p$. In short, if p is possible, so is ‘ p is possible’. Since every possible *positum* is to be admitted if it is posited, therefore if p is possible, then ‘ p is possible’ is to be admitted. Q. E. D.

⁵¹ cum] non (?) *add. sed del.*

⁵² Parixius = Parisius. See n. 2 above.

⁵³ The text of the rule appears corrupt as it stands in the MS. The correct emendation is not certain, although the general idea is clear enough. See the text of the reply, in § (15) below. The phrase ‘*posito possibili in illam de inesse*’ means roughly “assuming the possibility is realized.” See the examples at the end of the paragraph. A *propositio de inesse* is an “assertoric” proposition, as contrasted with a modal proposition. In my experience, the construction ‘*pono in*’ + accusative is unusual in the *obligationes*-literature. But John of Wesel uses it more than once. See again § (15) below. See also n. 55, below.

⁵⁴ Presumably John has in mind the traditional view that the possible can *become* impossible with the passage of time. For example, before Adam’s sin, the proposition ‘It will always be the case that Adam never sinned’ was false but possible (because of Adam’s free will). But after his sin, the same proposition was no longer possible, and will never become possible again. Note that this explanation is purely conjectural. We do not know enough about John’s theory of tense and modality (or about his doctrine of free will) to be confident that this is the sort of thing he was thinking of.

⁵⁵ istas] istis For the emendation, see § (15), and earlier in § (2).

⁵⁶ nullus] *terminatio incerta* But compare the reply in § (16) below.

nes. Consequens est falsum, ut⁵⁷ patet per experientiam. Et tamen consequentia patet per quid nominis necessarii.⁵⁸

20 (4) Etiam nullae species obligationis sunt necessariae in disputatione dialectica. Quod patet, quia nec positio nec impositio, quia unus potest disputare⁵⁹ cum alio sine eo quod ponat falsum possibile vel sine eo quod imponat terminos de novo ad significandum. Similiter, sine eo quod petat quid falsum. Et sic de aliis speciebus.

25 (5) In oppositum est Aristoteles in 8^o *Topicorum*,⁶⁰ ubi tractat de arte obligatoria tamquam de parte dialecticae.

(6) Hic est notandum quod ‘obligatio’ sumitur in proposito pro aliqua oratione qua quis obligatus per ista verba ‘peto’, ‘impono’, ‘pono’, et sic de aliis,⁶¹ tenetur affirmative vel negative vel dubie respondere.

30 (7) Similiter est notandum quod triplici causa⁶² casus sunt ponendi in obligationibus. Prima de causa, casus supponuntur ut temptetur⁶³ respondens numquid artem habeat. Secunda, ut disputatio habeatur, ut accidit inter conferentes ob causam exercitii. Tertia causa est ut falsum possibile admittatur inquirendo quid sequitur et sciatur per prius suppositum et rationem quid sumus acturi et responsuri.

35 (8) Item notandum quod haec ars nihil supponit dignum admitti nisi possibile. Et quidquid sequitur de eodem admissio formaliter concedendum est infra tempus obligationis sive disputationis. Et una cum hoc observetur quod quidquid repugnat posito vel concessio vel eisdem⁶⁴ est negandum, et quod⁶⁵ ex illis sequitur est concedendum. Et ideo haec ars informat respondentem quod advertat quid conceditur vel negatur ne duo repugnantia concedit infra idem tempus, quia Aristoteles in primo *Elenchorum*⁶⁶ docet argumenta multa proponere⁶⁷ ut de propositorum reponsione ob multiplicationem respondens non recolens redargueretur. A quo pro parte haec ars tradit originem ut advertentes nos indeceptos servemus.

40 (9) Item notandum quod disputatio dicitur actus syllogisticus unius ad alterum ad propositum ostendendum, et cetera, quod patet primo *Elenchorum*,⁶⁸ quod quadruplex est disputatio. Quaedam est /^{lv} doctrinalis, et est illa quae syllogizat ex propriis principiis

⁵⁷ ut] et The emendation is conjectural and not strictly necessary, but makes for a smoother reading.

⁵⁸ per ... necessarii] That is, the nominal definition of ‘necessary’. John does not tell us what he takes that nominal definition to be.

⁵⁹ disputare] *abbrev. illeg. (forte tamen) add. sed del.*

⁶⁰ Aristotle, *Topica* VIII.4–8 159^a15–160^b13.

⁶¹ aliis] *lectio incerta*

⁶² causa] differentia *Ex textu Mertonensi*, p. 243 [vi] (Spade, p. 242 n. 30).

⁶³ temptetur] teneretur *Ex textu Mertonensi*, p. 243 [vi] (Spade, p. 242 n. 32).

⁶⁴ quidquid ... vel eisdem] The ‘vel eisdem’ is awkward. Presumably the passage means roughly “whatever follows from the *positum* or the *concessum*, or from the two together.” Also, one would have expected the plural ‘*concessis*’ instead of the singular ‘*concesso*’.

⁶⁵ quod = quid

⁶⁶ Aristotle, *Sophistici elenchi* 15 174^a17–29.

⁶⁷ proponere] praeponere

⁶⁸ Aristotle, *Sophistici elenchi* 2 165^a38–^b11.

cujuslibet disciplinae et non ex⁶⁹ his quae videntur respondenti, quia sive respondens concedit sive non nihil ad opponentem. Et addit causam hujusmodi, quod opponens in disputatione doctrinali est loco docentis et⁷⁰ respondens loco addiscentis. Nam⁷¹ oportet addiscentem credere.⁷²

50 (10) Dialecticae disputationes dicuntur quae sunt ex probabilibus, et sunt collectivae contradictionum,⁷³ hoc est natae ad concludendum utramque partem contradictionis, quia dialectica debet habere rationes probabiles ad utramque partem contradictionis.

(11) Temptativae sunt ex his quae videntur respondenti.⁷⁴ Et addit⁷⁵ ‘necessarium⁷⁶ eum qui simulat se scire⁷⁷ habere scientiam’.⁷⁸ Quod potest exponi tam de illo qui
55 temptat quam de illo qui temptatur, quia ille qui temptat in communibus oportet quod sciat communia, et qui temptat in propriis oportet quod sciat propria. Similiter potest retorqueri ad illum qui temptatur. Oportet, cum scire ea simulat, se habere scientiam quia nisi sciret vilipenderetur cum fuerit temptatus.

(12) Litigiosae disputationes sunt quae syllogizant ex his quae videntur probabilia et non sunt.

60 (13) Similiter per ‘principia’ in proposito intelleguntur propositiones seu regulae quae sunt in ista arte.

(14) Tunc dicitur ad quaestionem. Prima conclusio est ista, quod in omni disputatione bona regulae obligationum sunt necesse. Ex qua sequitur quod fuit quod⁷⁹ in disputatione dialectica regulae obligationum sunt necessariae. Ista consequentia probatur: In omnia bona disputatione sic est quod sequens ex posito est concedendum, repugnans posito est negandum, ad impertinens posito est respondendum secundum sui qualitatem ita quod si sit verum est concedendum, si falsum est negandum. Et istae sunt regulae obligationum. Sequitur conclusio. Antecedens patet inducendo in disputatione juridica,
65 canonica vel simili, vel philosophica, et sic de omnibus aliis. Si respondens admittat⁸⁰ ali-

⁶⁹ non ... ex] *lectiones illegibiles* But see the text of Aristotle, *Sophistici elenchi* 2 165^b1, the Boethius translation, Bernard G. Dod, ed., (“Aristoteles Latinus” VI.1–3; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), p. 7 lines 8–10: “doctrinales quidem quae ex propriis principiis cuiusque disciplinae et non ex his quae respondent videntur syllogizant”

⁷⁰ et] *abbrev. incerta* (*forte* tamen) *add. sed expunct.*

⁷¹ Nam] *materia* The difference between the two abbreviations is a single minim, so that the emendation is paleographically minimal.

⁷² See Aristotle *Sophistici elenchi* 2 165^b2.

⁷³ contradictionum] *contradictionem*. But compare the text of Aristotle, Boethius’ translation, ed. cit., p. 7 lines 10–11: “dialecticae autem quae ex probabilibus collectivae contradictionum ...”

⁷⁴ respondent] *terminatio incerta*

⁷⁵ addit] *quod add. sed del.*

⁷⁶ necessarium] *exemplum* But see the text of Aristotle, ed. cit., p. 7 line 13: “necessarium est scire ei qui simulat habere scientiam”

⁷⁷ scire] *terminatio incerta*

⁷⁸ Ibid. See also the apparatus there.

⁷⁹ quod] *supra lin.*

⁸⁰ admittat] *ponat* Positing is the job of the opponent in an obligational disputation, not of the respondent. The text of the MS should probably be emended either to ‘*respondens admittat*’ (as I conjecture here) or else to ‘*opponens ponat*’.

quam positam, quidquid sequitur ex illa est concedendum bene respondendo. Similiter quidquid est repugnans illi est negandum bene respondendo. Sic similiter prius quaesitum.⁸¹

(15) Ad rationes. Ad primam, “Principia obligationum” et cetera,⁸² negatur antecedens et conceditur consequentia. Et cum dicitur “Illud est principium ‘Possibili posito’,” et cetera, conceditur. Et cum dicitur “Illud est falsum,” negatur, intellegendo sicut Philosophus intellegit.⁸³ Unde si sit aliqua propositio falsa possibilis et ponatur sic esse sicut ipsa <significat>, nullum sequitur impossibile. Sicut ista est possibilis ‘Tu es Romae’ te existente Paduae, et ideo si ponatur sic esse quod sis Romae, consequenter respondendo non sequitur aliquod impossibile. Nec ipse intellegit quod propositio de possibili <sic>⁸⁴ ponatur in unam de inesse. Et cum dicitur “Illud non est principium, quia est in potestate,” et cetera, conceditur. Tamen bene respondendo, cum sit possibile non implicans contradictionem, quodlibet tale possibile falsum est admittendum.

(16) Ad aliam, “Sequeretur quod nullus sciret disputare,” et cetera,⁸⁵ conceditur ‘nisi sciret regulas obligationum’.⁸⁶ Unde aliqui sciunt obligationes et tamen ignorant se scire ipsas. Immo dubitant quid nominis obligationis. Unde, sicut dictum est,⁸⁷ impossibile est aliquem bene respondere nisi utatur ^{2r} regulis obligationum. Tamen dubitat se uti illis.

(17) Ad aliam, “Nullae species,” et cetera,⁸⁸ conceditur. Tamen cum hoc stat quod in qualibet disputatione dialectica necessariae sunt species obligationis, sicut etiam conceditur quod nullus homo necessario est, et tamen necessario aliquis homo est.⁸⁹ Vel potest dici quod aliquae species sunt necessariae, sicut positio et depositio, quia⁹⁰ in qualibet disputatione mundi positum vel positio vel depositum vel depositio habet fieri, quia si aliqua conclusio tenetur <vel> sustinetur a respondenti, illa potest dici sibi⁹¹ posi-

⁸¹ Sic ... quaesitum] The sense appears to have been lost here. One would have expected something about how to reply to a *propositio impertinens*.

⁸² See § (2), above.

⁸³ Aristotle, *Analytica priora* I.13 32^a18–20; also *Metaphysica* IX.4 1047^b10–12.

⁸⁴ Without the emendation, the sentence makes little sense in the context. With the emendation, I interpret it as referring back to the examples given in § (2), where the propositions ‘*Album contingit esse nigrum*’ and ‘*Possibile potest esse impossibile*’ were said to be posited “*in istas de inesse* ‘*Album est nigrum*’ ‘*Possibile est impossibile*’.” The present sentence, then, as I read it, says that Aristotle did not have this kind of case in mind.

⁸⁵ See § (3), above.

⁸⁶ nisi ... obligationum] The ‘nisi’ is awkward here. I have punctuated as if these four words are meant to be an (approximate) *quotation* from the argument in § (3). In that case, the sense of the whole passage is that the claim in that argument is granted. One *would* be unable to argue unless he knew the rules of *obligationes*.

⁸⁷ Presumably, the reference is again to § (3), above, although the point is not put this way there.

⁸⁸ See § (4), above.

⁸⁹ This is presumably under the Aristotelian hypothesis of the necessity of species. John, who presumably accepted the doctrine of a contingent creation, would not be able to grant that necessarily some man exists.

⁹⁰ quia] quae

⁹¹ sibi] sive For the emendation, see ‘sibi deposita’ in the next sentence.

95 tum. Et ejus contradictoria est sibi deposita, quia durante tempore obligationis habet negare illam, et cetera.

III

(18) /^{4v17} <C>onsequenter quaeritur utrum sint tantum tres species obligationis.

100 (19) Arguitur quod non. Sex sunt species obligationis; igitur non tantum tres sunt species obligationis. Consequentia patet. Antecedens determinatur, quia istae sunt species obligationis: institutio, petitio, impositio, positio, depositio, dubitatio, et sit verum.⁹²

(20) Et confirmatur: Positio non est species obligationis; igitur, non sunt tres species obligationis. Consequentia patet, quia si essent tres species obligationis, positio esset de numero illarum. Antecedens determinatur: Si positio esset obligatio, ex non impossibili⁹³ sequeretur impossibile. Sed hoc est falsum et contra omnes regulas obligationis.

(21) Antecedens determinatur, quia si ponatur ista ‘Tu es Romae’, ista est admittenda, quia possibile. Deinde proponitur ‘Manus mea est clausa’. Et sit ita quod est clausa. Est concedenda, quia est vera et impertinens. Deinde proponatur ‘Manus mea⁹⁴ est clausa vel tu es asinus’. Ista est concedenda⁹⁵ quia sequens ex bene concesso, quia sequitur: “Manus mea est clausa; igitur, manus mea est clausa vel tu es asinus” a parte disjunctivae ad totam disjunctivam. Deinde proponatur ‘Manus mea non est clausa’. Ista est concedenda quia vera et impertinens. Et sit ita in tempore prolotionis istius quod manus mea non sit clausa.⁹⁶ Tunc sic: Manus mea est clausa vel tu es asinus; sed manus mea non est clausa; igitur, tu es asinus. Ista consequentia est bona, et antecedens est a te concessa et vera; igitur, consequens est a te concedenda et vera. Et consequens est impossibile; igitur.

120 (22) Sed aliquis diceret quod consequentia non valet, quia ad hoc /^{5r} quod consequentia sit bona a tota disjunctiva cum opposito unius partis ad aliam, oportet sumere oppositum contradictorium unius partis et non subcontrarium. Unde ista consequentia non valet: “Homo est albus vel tu es asinus; et homo non est albus; igitur, tu es asinus,” quia totum antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Sed debet sic argui: “Homo est albus vel tu es asinus; sed nullus homo est albus; igitur, tu es asinus.” Sic similiter in proposito: “Manus mea est clausa vel tu es asinus; sed nulla manus mea est clausa; igitur, tu es asinus.”

(23) Sed contra: Adhuc stat argumentum, quia posito sicut prius quod in tempore locutionis disjunctivae habeas unam manum clausam et aliam apertam, et in tempore prolotionis illius ‘Nulla manus mea est clausa’ sit quod quaelibet manus tua sit aperta,

⁹² For this list, see n. 32 above.

⁹³ impossibili] impertinente

⁹⁴ mea] non *add. sed forte del.*

⁹⁵ concedenda] *abbreviatio illegibilis add. supra lin.*

⁹⁶ Earlier in the paragraph it was said that ‘Manus mea est clausa’ is also true and irrelevant. The idea is that you have one hand open and one closed. For confirmation, see § (23).

tunc per te consequentia fuit bona, et tamen antecedens fuit verum et consequens impos-

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(24) Et confirmatur. Non sunt tantum tres species propositionis; igitur, non tantum tres species obligationis. Consequentia probatur per definitionem obligationis: “Obligatio est oratio qua quis obligatus⁹⁷ <per ista verba ‘peto’, ‘impono’, ‘pono’, et sic de aliis>⁹⁸ tenetur affirmative vel⁹⁹ negative¹⁰⁰ respondere. Sed omne illud quo aliquis

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tenetur affirmative vel negative respondere est propositio¹⁰¹; igitur, obligatio est propositio. (25) Similiter, obligatio est oratio; et non est oratio imperfecta; igitur, perfecta. Et omnis talis est propositio. Ex quo sequitur quod omnis obligatio est propositio. Et sic sequitur quod in omni¹⁰² propositione sit obligatio, quia omnis propositio vocalis est oratio qua aliquis respondet affirmative vel negative; igitur, omnis propositio vocalis est obligatio, quod videtur falsum.¹⁰³

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(26) Antecedens determinatur, quia multae sunt species propositionis: categoricum, hypotheticum, affirmativum, negativum, modalis et de inesse, universalis et particularis. Et sic patet quod non tantum sunt tres species propositionis.

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(27) Etiam nullius obligationis sunt tres species; igitur, obligationis non sunt tres species. Consequentia patet. Antecedens determinatur: cum quaelibet obligatio sit positio¹⁰⁴ et complexum, non habet aliquas species, quia solum est una obligatio vel una species obligationis; igitur, non sunt tres. Consequentia patet.

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(28) Antecedens determinatur: Omnis obligatio est¹⁰⁵ positio, cum in omni¹⁰⁶ obligatione aliquid ponitur alicui ab ipso esse sustinendum.

(29) In oppositum est auctor in littera,¹⁰⁷ qui ponit quod omnis obligatio aut concernit complexa tantum aut partim complexa et partim incomplexa. Si concernit complexa tantum, hoc est dupliciter: vel hoc est ad concedendum, et sic est positio, vel obligat ad negandum, sic est depositio. Si concernit partim complexa et partim incomplexa, sic est impositio.

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(30) Sed alia est opinio magistri Gualteri Burley,¹⁰⁸ qui ponit sex species obligationis. Et dicit quod obligatio sit praefixio alicujus enuntiabilis secundum aliquem sta-

⁹⁷ obligatus] obligatur For the emendation, compare § (6).

⁹⁸ For the insertion, see *ibid.*

⁹⁹ vel] *corr. ex abbrev. corrupta*

¹⁰⁰ Note that the alternative ‘*vel dubie*’ of § (6) is here omitted.

¹⁰¹ propositio] *sed add. sed del.*

¹⁰² omni] *sup. lin.*

¹⁰³ Note that, contrary to the argument here, the definition of an *obligatio* was *not* that it is a proposition whereby someone *responds* affirmatively or negatively (or doubtfully — see n. 100 above), but that it is one whereby one is *bound* to respond so. See § (6).

¹⁰⁴ positio] propositio For the emendation, see § (28).

¹⁰⁵ est] propositio *add. sed del.*

¹⁰⁶ omni] *sup. lin.*

¹⁰⁷ Swyneshed, *Obligationes*, Spade ed., § (3), p. 250.

¹⁰⁸ Burley, *Obligationes*, Green ed., § 0.02: “... Obligatio sic dividitur: aut obligat ad actum aut ad habitum, et utraque sic dividitur: aut quia cadit super complexum aut super incomplexum. Si obliget ad actum et cadat super incomplexum, sic est ‘petitio’. Si

tum. Et dicitur ‘obligatio’ quasi ‘ob aliud ligatio’. Unde ponit quod omnis obligatio¹⁰⁹ aut obligat ad actum vel ad habitum. Si ad actum, hoc est dupliciter: aut cadit supra complexum vel supra incomplexum. Si supra incomplexum, est petitio, sicut cum petitur

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“Peto te concedere primum propositum a me” vel “Peto te negare” et sic de aliis. Ista obligatio cadit supra istum actum incomplexum: concedere, vel negare.

(31) Si supra complexum, sic est sit verum, sicut cum dicitur “Sit verum te scire te currere” et sic de aliis. Ista obligatio cadit supra complexum mediante isto verbo

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‘scire’ ‘dubitare’.

(32) Sed ad habitum, hoc est dupliciter, quia aut indifferenter cadit supra vel incomplexum, et sic est impositio vel institutio, vel tantum cadit supra complexum, et hoc est tripliciter, quia aut cadit super complexum ad habendum pro vero, et sic est positio, vel ad habendum pro falso, et sic est depositio /^{5v} vel pro dubio, et sic est dubitatio. Et sic

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patet quod sunt sex species obligationis.

(33) Hic est notandum quod obligatio sumitur ad similitudinem obligationis communiter dictae, quia sicut obligatio sit ex connexione aliqua¹¹⁰ ad implendum promissum ex consensu utriusque partis, sic similiter sumitur in proposito. Et sic dictum est: “Talis obligatio sit ob causam exercitii, vel ad habendum experientiam an aliquis habeat

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artem, vel ut consequenter dicta sua sustineat ne repugnantia concedat.”¹¹¹

(34) Item, notandum quod ista de virtute sermonis est falsa: Obligationis sunt tres species. Sed intellegitur quod illius termini ‘obligatio’ significative sumpti sunt aliquae species.

(35) Deinde ponantur aliquae conclusiones. Prima conclusio est quod non tantum sunt tres species obligationis. Ista patet, quia sequitur: Tantum tres sunt species obligationis; igitur, non tantum tres sunt species obligationis, quia si essent tantum tres species obligationis, essent duae species obligationis¹¹²; et duae species obligationis non sunt tres species obligationis. Et sequitur ab exclusiva ad universalem de terminis transpositis “Tantum tres sunt species obligationis; igitur, omnes species obligationis sunt tres,” quod

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est falsum, quia duae species non sunt tres, nec quattuor et¹¹³ sic de aliis.

(36) Alia conclusio est quod tres species obligationis sufficiunt; igitur, tres obligationes. Consequentia patet, quia obligatio non est nisi aliquis respondeat affirmative vel negative vel dubie, cum non sit nisi oratio qua aliquis obligatus istis modis tenetur respondere.

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(37) Antecedens patet: Discurrendo per singulas propositiones et disputationes, si propositio proposita sit impertinens et scita esse vera, est concedenda; si sit impertinens scita esse falsa, est neganda; si sit impertinens et dubites significatum per illam, est du-

super complexum, sic est ‘sit verum’. Si obliget ad habitum et cadat super incomplexum, sic est ‘institutio’. Si super complexum, aut obligat ad habendum pro vero, et sic est ‘positio’, aut ad habendum pro falso, et sic est ‘depositio’, aut ad habendum pro dubio, et sic est ‘dubitatio’ ...”

¹⁰⁹ obligatio] ob ligatio

¹¹⁰ aliqua] tam *add.*

¹¹¹ Compare § (7).

¹¹² obligationis] igitur *add. sed forte del.*

¹¹³ et] sicut *add. sed del.*

bitanda; si sit pertinens et sequens sine obligatione ad hoc pertinentem, est concedenda; si sit repugnans, est neganda. Sed constat quod omnis propositio est pertinens vel impertinens. Et ex hoc patet quod aliae species obligationis, sicut est impositio, petitio, et sit verum, reducuntur ad illas.

(38) Similiter, in omni obligatione implicite habetur positio. Similiter, depositio, quia omnis propositio quae ponitur, ejus contradictoria deponitur.

(39) Ad rationes. Ad primam: “Sex sunt species obligationis,” et cetera.¹¹⁴ Conceditur consequentia, quia consequens est pro prima conclusione. Similiter conceditur quod istae sex species possunt reduci ad tres species.

(40) Ad aliam: “Positio non est obligatio,”¹¹⁵ negatur antecedens.¹¹⁶ Et conceditur consequentia. Ad probationem “Si positio esset obligatio, ex non impossibili,”¹¹⁷ et cetera, negatur consequentia. Et cum dicitur “Ponatur quod tu es Romae. Deinde proponatur ‘Manus mea est clausa’,” conceditur, quia est vera et impertinens.

(41) Similiter, conceditur quod manus mea est clausa vel tu es asinus. Et cum proponitur ‘Manus mea non est clausa’, ista est concedenda. Et tunc negatur consequentia, sicut dictum fuit.¹¹⁸

(42) Sed si proponatur ista ‘Nulla manus mea est clausa’, ista est neganda, quia quamvis non repugnat posito, tamen repugnat bene concesso.

(43) Et etiam, responsiones sunt retorquendae ad idem instans.

(44) Unde est notandum: Si aliquis faceret talem consequentiam ‘Tu sedes; igitur, tu non stas’ et in tempore prolacionis antecedentis antecedens esset verum et in tempore prolacionis consequentis consequens esset falsum, ita quod dum consequens proferitur tu stares, tamen ista consequentia est a te semper concedenda, quia pro eodem instanti pro quo antecedens est verum, si consequens esset formatum, esset verum. Sic similiter in proposito: Quamvis in tali copulativa ‘Manus mea est clausa vel tu¹¹⁹ /6r es asinus et nulla manus mea est clausa’, quaelibet pars in tempore prolacionis fuisset¹²⁰ vera, tamen quia copulativa copulat illas pro eodem instanti, ipsa est falsa et impertinens. Et ideo ista consequentia est bona et concedenda ‘Manus mea est clausa vel tu es asinus; et nulla manus mea est clausa; igitur, tu es asinus’, tamen tam¹²¹ antecedens quam consequens est negandum.

(45) Ad aliam: “Non sunt tantum tres species propositionis; igitur,”¹²² et cetera. Conceditur consequentia et similiter antecedens. Similiter conceditur consequens, quia est pro prima conclusione. Etiam conceditur quod omnis obligatio sit propositio. Et sicut conceditur quod infinitae sunt species illius termini ‘propositio’, sic similiter illius ter-

¹¹⁴ See § (19).

¹¹⁵ See § (20).

¹¹⁶ antecedens] aliquid *add. sed del.*

¹¹⁷ impossibili] impertinente Compare the apparatus to § (20).

¹¹⁸ See § (22).

¹¹⁹ vel tu] *iter. in initio fol. 6r*

¹²⁰ fuisset] fuisit

¹²¹ tam] totum

¹²² See § (24).

mini ‘obligatio’, quia tot sunt obligationes quot modis contingit obligari. Sed infinities contingit obligari.

(46) Ad aliam: “Nullius obligationis sunt tantum tres species,”¹²³ concedatur. Unde dicitur quod sicut istae non contradicunt ‘Nullus homo est species’ ‘Homo est species’, supposito quod iste terminus ‘homo’ in secunda supponat materialiter vel simpliciter et in prima significative et personaliter, sic similiter intellegitur in proposito quod nullius obligationis sunt tres species, et tamen illius termini ‘obligatio’ significative sumptus sunt tres species. Etiam si¹²⁴ terminus supponat personaliter, tunc ista est falsa ‘Obligationis sunt tres species’, quia ut dictum est, species dicitur alicujus generis, scilicet, alicujus termini incomplexi. Modo obligatio est propositio,¹²⁵ quamvis iste terminus ‘obligatio’ sit quoddam genus potens supponere pro quolibet complexo quod dicitur obligatio.

(47) Ad aliam: “Solum est una obligatio,”¹²⁶ potest dici concedendo. Sicut conceditur ista¹²⁷ ‘Tantum unum est’ quia omne ens est unum, sic similiter tantum una obligatio; igitur, omnis obligatio est una. Si tamen intellegitur quod tantum positio sit obligatio, negatur, quia depositio et dubitatio et sic de aliis sunt obligationes. Et non sunt positio, quamvis positio implicite in omni obligatione¹²⁸ commutatur.¹²⁹

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(48) <Q>uaeritur primo utrum in insolubilibus sit aliqua consequentia bona, et antecedens est verum et consequens falsum.

(49) Arguitur quod non, quia ista est regula generalis, quod in omni consequentia bona et formali antecedens non potest esse verum sine consequente.

250 (50) Similiter, in omni consequentia bona et formali, si consequens est falsum, et antecedens. Quod non esset si in aliquibus esset exceptio.

(51) Etiam Aristoteles esset diminutus et alii logici, cum numquam in aliqua materia fecerunt exceptionem.

255 (52) Similiter, tunc in aliqua consequentia bona et formali oppositum consequentis staret in veritate cum antecedente, quod est contra bonam consequentiam,¹³⁰ cum in bona consequentia oppositum consequentis debet repugnare antecedenti. Probatio con-

¹²³ See § (27).

¹²⁴ si] uterque *add.* It is possible to construe the ‘uterque’ as referring to ‘homo’ and ‘obligatio’. But ‘homo’ is entirely irrelevant to the rest of the sentence.

¹²⁵ obligatio ... propositio] *in marg.*

¹²⁶ See § (27).

¹²⁷ ista] iste The masculine makes no sense here.

¹²⁸ obligatione] cor- (?) *add. sed del.*

¹²⁹ commutatur] *lectio incerta (forte comictatur)*

¹³⁰ consequentiam] q- *add. sed forte del.*

sequentiae,¹³¹ quia per te in bona consequentia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum; ergo, oppositum consequentis est verum; et omne verum cum alio vero potest simul stare in veritate, cum nullum verum alteri vero repugnat. Etiam, si consequens est falsum,
 260 oppositum consequentis est verum. Patet per primum principium.

(53) Similiter, per legem contradictoriorum, quod contradictoria non possunt simul esse vera.

(54) Etiam, si esset aliqua talis consequentia, maxime esset ‘Istius consequentiae¹³² talis consequens est falsum; igitur, consequens est falsum’, demonstrando per ly¹³³ ‘illius’ istamet consequentiam. Si ista consequentia sit bona, contra: igitur, non potest sic esse sicut significatur per antecedens quin sic sit sicut significatur per consequens; igitur, qualitercumque significatur per antecedens significatur per consequens; sed aliquo qualiter significatur per consequens qualiter non significatur per antecedens, quia consequens significat se esse verum et se esse falsum, et taliter esse est impossibile; et si antecedens sit verum constat quod non significat sic sicut significatur per consequens; et si sic sit totaliter sicut significatur per antecedens, et non potest sic esse sicut significatur per antecedens quin sic sit sicut significatur per consequens, igitur totaliter sic est sicut significatur per consequens; et si totaliter sic est sicut significatur per consequens, consequens erit verum; et sic, si antecedens erit verum, consequens erit verum.

(55) In oppositum arguitur: Ista consequentia est bona ‘Hoc est falsum; igitur, hoc est falsum’. Et demonstro per utrumque ‘hoc’ ipsum consequens. Et tamen in ista consequentia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum.

(56) Quod ista consequentia sit bona probatur: Oppositum consequentis repugnat contradictorie antecedenti. Similiter, oppositum consequentis infert oppositum antecedentis; igitur, est bona. Similiter consequens est de intellectu antecedentis. Et istae sunt conditiones requisitae ad bonam consequentiam.

(57) Antecedens¹³⁴ patet, quia da oppositum consequentis: /^{18v} ‘Hoc¹³⁵ non est falsum’. Tunc, planum est, ista sunt contradictoria: ‘Hoc est falsum’ ‘Hoc non est falsum’ eodem demonstrato. Et sequitur: “Hoc non est falsum; igitur, hoc non est falsum,” eodem demonstrato, quia sicut prius, oppositum consequentis et antecedens contradicunt.

(58) Quod antecedens¹³⁶ sit verum probatur, quia sit antecedens B et consequens A. Tunc arguitur: B, si esset extra consequentiam et per se prolatum vel scriptum, esset verum. Et non amittit¹³⁷ suam significationem cum ingreditur consequentiam, nec est variatio facta ex parte rei; igitur, tunc est verum. Consequentia patet, quia non posset pluribus modis imaginari.¹³⁸ Etiam, istae sufficiunt ad hoc quod propositio maneat vera.

¹³¹ consequentiae] *terminatio incerta*

¹³² consequentiae] *iter. sed secundum del.*

¹³³ ly] *abbrev. illeg. add. sed del.*

¹³⁴ That is, the “antecedent” of the argument in § (56). The argument there is implicitly three separate arguments: three conditions are met, each of which is sufficient for the validity of the inference. Note that while the first two conditions of § (56) are addressed here in § (57), the third one is not.

¹³⁵ Hoc] Haec

¹³⁶ That is, the antecedent of the inference mentioned in § (55).

¹³⁷ amittit] admittit

¹³⁸ That is, one cannot imagine any more ways in which it might change its truth value.

(59) Antecedens determinatur, quia B significat quod A est falsum, et subjectum B solum supponit pro A et non falsificat se, et sic est totaliter quod A est falsum; igitur, B est verum. Consequentia patet. Et determinatur ex alio, quia ponatur quod C sit una consimilis propositio quam profert Plato, scilicet ‘Hoc est falsum’, ita quod subjectum C etiam supponat pro A. Tunc C¹³⁹ est verum, quia significat quod A est falsum, et non falsificat se, et totaliter sic est quod A est falsum; igitur, C est verum. Consequentia patet, quia qualitercumque est verum, taliter vere contingit enuntiare; sed verum est quod A est falsum; igitur, contingit vere enuntiare quod A est falsum.

(60) Tunc ultra: C est verum; et qualitercumque C significat B significat; et non est pertinens ad inferendum se ipsum esse falsum; igitur, B est verum. Consequentia est nota, et antecedens similiter patet.

(61) Et confirmatur: Illa consequentia est bona in qua non potest esse sicut significatur per antecedens quin sic sit sicut significatur per consequens. Sic est in ista, ‘Hoc est falsum; igitur, hoc est falsum’ eodem demonstrato. Consequentia patet. Antecedens determinatur: Antecedens significat consequens esse falsum. Et rationabiliter sic est quod consequens est falsum, et non potest esse si hoc sit falsum, demonstrato A, quin ipsummet¹⁴⁰ sit falsum.

(62) Hic est notandum¹⁴¹ quod est una opinio quae negat omnes tales consequentias ‘Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, Sortes dicit falsum’ si antecedens proferatur a Platone et consequens a Sorte¹⁴² et si Sortes nihil dicat aliud quam talem propositionem ‘Sortes dicit falsum’, quia dicunt quod in nulla bona consequentia et formali antecedens potest esse verum sine consequente. Sic est in proposito.

(63) Similiter, argueretur quod antecedens esset verum et similiter quod esset falsum, quod est impossibile. Quod esset verum patet. Quod etiam esset falsum probatio: quia sequitur “Ista consequentia esset bona et consequens esset falsum; igitur, et antecedens.” Et patet per regulas Aristotelis.

(64) Item notandum quod si Sortes profert talem propositionem ‘Falsum est’ et nullam aliam, quae sit A, et Plato profert talem consimilem ‘Falsum est’ quae sit B, quod tales propositiones convertuntur, et nulla istarum esset vera. Etiam, si tales consimiles in infinitum multiplicarentur ‘Falsum est’ ‘Falsum est’ et nullae aliae essent, quaelibet istarum esset falsa. Sed tamen si proferatur una talis falsa ‘Homo est asinus’ vel ‘Deus non est’ sic significando, omnes tales efficientur¹⁴³ verae.

(65) Sed ista positio videtur deficere. Solum est petere principium cum dicitur “Ista consequentia est bona; igitur, antecedens non potest esse verum sine consequente.” Nec etiam sequitur universaliter: “Antecedens non potest esse verum sine consequente; igitur, consequentia est bona,” quia sicut dictum¹⁴⁴ fuit alias,¹⁴⁵ ista consequentia non valet

¹³⁹ C] A

¹⁴⁰ ipsummet] ipsamet *sed corr. in marg.*

¹⁴¹ notandum] notanda

¹⁴² Sorte] et s- *add.* This seems to be a false start for ‘et si’. It does not appear to be deleted.

¹⁴³ efficientur] efficientur

¹⁴⁴ dictum] *forte* dicta

¹⁴⁵ I have not located any such statement elsewhere in John of Wesel.

‘Tu sedes; igitur, haec est vera “Tu sedes” vel talis propositio “Tu sedes” est vera’, quia posset esse quod tu sedes et nulla talis propositio esset. Sed dicitur quod sufficit quod non posset sic esse sicut significatur per antecedens quin¹⁴⁶ sic sit sicut significatur per consequens. Etiam aliis conditionibus requisitis, quod oppositum consequentis¹⁴⁷ infert oppositum antecedentis, et cetera.¹⁴⁸ Sic est in istis consequentiis: ‘Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, dicit falsum’ ‘Hoc est falsum; igitur, hoc est falsum’. Et dicere quod in omni bona consequentia si consequens est falsum antecedens est falsum est petere principium.

(66) Ideo dicitur ponendo unam conclusionem, quod tales consequentiae sunt bonae. Et hoc probatur sicut prius.¹⁴⁹

(67) Ad rationes. Ad primam,¹⁵⁰ /19r “Ista est regula generalis quod in omni consequentia bona et formali,” et cetera,¹⁵¹ dicitur quod intellegitur in propositionibus significantibus principaliter sicut est vel significantibus principaliter qualiter non est, et non in talibus propositionibus se ipsis falsificantibus, quia in talibus casibus propositio falsa convertitur cum vera et e converso. Et de illis Aristoteles non intellegit.

(68) Et cum dicitur “igitur esset diminutus et alii logici, cum non fecit exceptionem,”¹⁵² dicitur quod immo fecit exceptionem quarto *Metaphysicae*,¹⁵³ ubi posuit contra antiquos omnes tales propositiones se ipsas destruere ‘Omnia sunt vera’, quia si omnia sunt vera, sequitur quod contrarium vel contradictorium illius sit vera, scilicet, ‘Non omnia sunt vera’.

(69) Etiam posset dici quod non est inconueniens Aristotelem esse diminutum eo quod non posuit omnia quae fuissent ponenda, quia <nec> ipse nec aliquis alius ad haec sufficeret.

(70) Et sic similiter posset dici ad aliam,¹⁵⁴ quod in tali casu non est inconueniens consequens esse falsum et antecedens esse verum.

(71) Ad aliam, “Illa consequentia non valet ubi oppositum consequentis stat in veritate cum antecedente,” si ista est universalis, tunc est neganda, ita quod sit sensus: “Nulla est consequentia bona ubi¹⁵⁵ oppositum consequentis stat in veritate cum antecedente.” Si sit indefinita, potest concedi. Tamen cum hoc stat quod aliqua talis est bona, sicut in proposito.

(72) Alia est solutio,¹⁵⁶ quia dicitur quod non potest sic esse sicut significatur per antecedens quin sic sit sicut significatur per consequens. Et cum dicitur “totaliter sic est sicut significatur per antecedens,” conceditur. Et cum dicitur “impossibile est esse sicut significatur per consequens quia consequens significat se esse verum et se esse falsum et

¹⁴⁶ quin] si *add. sed del.*

¹⁴⁷ consequentis] *abbreviationes corruptae add. sed del.*

¹⁴⁸ For the required conditions, see § (56).

¹⁴⁹ prius] *forte primo*

¹⁵⁰ Ad rationes. Ad primam] *iter. in marg. infimo paginae et etiam in initio fol.19r.*

¹⁵¹ See § (49).

¹⁵² See § (51).

¹⁵³ Aristotle, *Metaphysica* IV.8 1012^b13–17.

¹⁵⁴ See § (50).

¹⁵⁵ ubi] nisi

¹⁵⁶ solutio] solveri

360 taliter <esse> est impossibile,” potest dici: Concedo quod consequens est falsum et impossibile, et hoc significat antecedens; igitur, concluditur quod antecedens sit verum. Et similiter, conceditur quod totaliter sic est quod consequens est falsum, et consequens significat quod consequens est falsum, et tamen consequens est falsum.

365 (73) Unde non bene valet ista consequentia: “Totaliter sic est quod consequens est falsum; et sic significat consequens; igitur, consequens est verum.” Sed oportet addere ‘et consequens sic significat et non est impertinens ad inferendum se ipsum esse falsum; igitur, consequens est verum’. Et tunc antecedens est falsum, et per consequens similiter consequens debet esse falsum.

